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I. INTRODUCTION
Carol Anne Bond received news from her best friend, Myrlinda
Haynes, that Haynes was pregnant.' Unbeknownst to Bond, the father of
Haynes's baby was Carol's husband, Clifford Bond.2 Upon discovering
this fact, Bond vowed to get revenge on Haynes and to make her life "a
living hell."' Bond made threatening phone calls to Haynes, sent letters
containing photos of Haynes with her face cut by a razor, and attempted
to have Haynes fired by making disparaging comments to her employ-
ers.4 Haynes reported these threats to the police, and a Pennsylvania
court convicted Bond of harassment, leading Bond to change her tac-
tics.' Bond, a trained microbiologist, stole toxic chemicals' from the
Rohm & Hass laboratory where she worked and ordered additional toxic
* Writing and Research Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate,
University of Miami School of Law, 2012. I am grateful to my advisor, Patrick Gudridge, for his
guidance and invaluable insight. I dedicate this to my family, and to Kevin, for his tolerance and
support.
1. Bond v. United States, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Adam Liptak, A 10th Amendment Drama Fit for Daytime TV Heads to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, at A14.
4. Brief for Respondent at 4, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
5. Id.
6. 10-chlorol0H-phenoxarsine. Half a teaspoon of this chemical is lethal to an adult when
ingested. Bond, 581 F.3d at 132.
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chemicals over the Internet,' which she attempted to use on Haynes.'
Bond was eventually arrested by federal investigators and charged under
the federal statutory implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention, which criminalized the knowing use of a "chemical
weapon"-any chemical capable of causing "temporary incapacitation
or permanent harm to humans or animals"-by any person.9
Bond argued that the federal statute violates the Tenth Amendment,
since the police power is reserved to the states.10 Bond's argument
makes much sense on its face; it seems unlikely that a federal statute
intended to prevent the use of chemical weapons on an international
scale would be capable of addressing a domestic crime. This particular
federal statute, however, was the result of a multilateral treaty, which the
federal government signed and implemented under its powers granted in
Article II, sec. 2, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The treaty power is
expansive, as the Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Holland: "It is
obvious that there may be matters . . . that an act of Congress could not
deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could . .. ."" This
would seem to indicate that the Tenth Amendment is powerless to limit
federal action when treaties are involved.
How, then, could Bond's concern be addressed? Bond v. U.S.
presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to overhaul Holland,
setting out clear limits on the treaty power once and for all. The
Supreme Court did not, however, seize this opportunity.12 Certainly the
7. Potassium dichromate. Less than a quarter of a teaspoon represents a lethal dose. Id.
8. John Shiffman, Wife Charged with Using Chemical to Attack Rival, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 15, 2007, at B3.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 229F (2006).
10. Brief for Respondent at 6, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010). The Tenth
Amendment states "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X. While the debates surrounding the meaning of the Tenth Amendment are too
involved to discuss here, courts have recognized that the states have police power. Police power
has no precise definition, but in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court wrote that "[the] court has
refrained from any attempt to define the limits of that [police] power, yet it has distinctly
recognized the authority of a State to enact . .. all laws that relate to matters completely within its
territory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people of other States." 197 U.S.
11, 25 (1905).
11. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
12. Instead, the Court chose to address only the issue of standing in its June 16, 2011
decision, despite the fact that both parties conceded that Bond had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute under which she was convicted. Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227
(June 16, 2011). This outcome was hardly surprising. The Supreme Court has a long history of
declining to review an issue of constitutionality "in advance of the necessity of deciding it."
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-9 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court's holding in Bond follows this tradition by addressing outstanding issues other
than the constitutionality of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, allowing the
Third Circuit to come to a decision before potentially issuing its own opinion on the matter.
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attempt to define such limitations has been at the forefront of scholarly
research,' 3 with analysis of the treaty power's limitations generally fall-
ing into one of two camps: the Nationalist view, which holds that the
treaty power is only limited by the structure of the Constitution, and the
New Federalist view, which holds that the treaty power should be lim-
ited by federalism and the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.
The Supreme Court, however, may not be the best place to look for
limitations on the treaty power, as it still holds Holland to be good
law." Additionally, judicial restrictions on procedural and subject mat-
ter aspects of the treaty power suffer the problem of being too subjective
for practical use.'" The broad range of international agreements in exis-
tence today is particularly ill suited to the concept of simple rules sepa-
rating valid and invalid uses of federal power. The executive branch,
perhaps ironically, is a better source of limitations, since the executive is
granted the power to make treaties by the Constitution.' 6 I propose that
the executive branch, through cooperation with state governments,
indeed presents the best and most appropriate solution to the treaty
power issues raised by Bond and future cases.
13. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2009 Sup. CT. REV.
131 (2009); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867
(2005); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075 (2000); Judith Resnik,
Federalism and International Law: The Internationalism of American Federalism, 73 Mo. L.
REv. 1105 (2008); Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003); Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty
Implementation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1025 (2010); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:
Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 245 (2001); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 A.J.I.L. 341 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 322, 341 (1924) (holding that a commerce treaty
with Japan cannot "be rendered nugatory ... by municipal ordinances or state laws"); Amaya v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1946) (stating that the treaty-making power
"might even be superior to those powers which are reserved to the states"); Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (holding that the Property Clause gives Congress enforcement
power over public lands, "state law notwithstanding").
15. See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the
Treaty Power, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1327, 1353-56 (2006); see generally Resnik, supra note 13.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . ."). Additionally, Michael Paulsen has stated that
the executive branch has the greatest power to interpret the law due to the breadth of the executive
power, the mechanisms with which to implement and enforce such interpretations, and the
"unique, strategic position of the executive as often the first and typically also the last branch to
act on any given issue of legal controversy." (emphasis in original). Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 223 (1994).
The irony is that the broad sweep of the executive branch's power to define the law, when
combined with the expansive treaty power of Holland, allows the executive to largely ignore
federalism constraints when making treaties while simultaneously putting the executive in the best
position to defer to federalism concerns in treaty implementation.
2012] 569
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Part II provides the facts of Bond v. United States, and describes
how this case represents fertile ground to discuss the treaty power and to
create a more permanent and stable solution to the concerns and debates
surrounding treaty power. Then Part III will discuss approaches to the
judicial control of treaties, and how the current mechanisms proposed
are both insufficient for success in the long run as well as unlikely to
occur based on the interpretation of Missouri v. Holland by subsequent
decisions. Part IV explains the role of the executive in treaty-making and
how the executive may currently choose to self-regulate the treaty
power. Again, many of these executive branch tools fail to clarify the
boundaries of the treaty power.
Finally, in Part V, I present the "fill in the gaps" approach, a flexi-
ble system for the implementation of treaties that maintains the protec-
tions of federalism while enabling the federal government to act quickly
and decisively when needed. Under this system, the states are free to
implement the portions of international treaty obligations that fall within
their jurisdiction, with the federal government implementing national-
level obligations and also providing "fallback" legislation for states that
choose not to create their own implementing legislation. Lastly, I con-
clude by analyzing how this new proposal plays into the overall frame-
work of the treaty power.
II. BACKGROUND OF BOND V. UNITED STATES
Carol Anne Bond began a campaign of harassment that culminated
in stealing chemicals from the laboratory where she worked and attempt-
ing to poison her best friend, Myrlinda Haynes, after discovering that
Haynes was pregnant with Bond's husband's child." For several
months, Bond placed the chemicals on Haynes' doorknob, car door han-
dle, and mailbox.'8 Haynes received a chemical burn once on her thumb,
but otherwise saw the chemicals and avoided them.19 After noticing the
chemicals several times, Haynes called her local police to report these
incidents.2 0 The police thought the substance might have been cocaine,
and simply told Haynes to clean the affected surfaces.21 Police testing
revealed that the substance was not cocaine, but the police took no fur-
ther action; Haynes contacted the police department over a dozen times
in an effort to provoke a more detailed investigation.22 The lack of
police action proved unsatisfactory for Haynes, who next complained to
17. Bond v. United States, 581 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2009).
18. Brief for Respondent at 3, Bond, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
19. Id.
20. Bond, 581 F.3d at 132.
21. Id.
22. Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Bond, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
570 [Vol. 66:567
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her postal carriers about the chemicals on her mailbox.2 3 The postal car-
riers then referred the issue to the United States Postal Inspection
Service.24
Postal inspectors placed surveillance cameras around Haynes's
premises, and caught Bond on film stealing mail, walking back and forth
between her own car and Haynes's car, and placing chemicals in
Haynes's car's muffler.25 The postal inspectors tested the chemicals in
Haynes's muffler, which eventually led to an arrest warrant for Bond.26
Upon arrest, the postal inspectors took Bond to a holding cell at the
Philadelphia Post Office, where Bond admitted to stealing chemicals
from her employer.27
Inspectors discovered additional incriminating evidence in Bond's
home, and a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged
Bond with two counts of possessing and using chemical weapons and
two counts of mail theft. 28 Bond filed a motion to suppress some of the
evidence against her on account of failure to establish probable cause for
the search, as well as a motion to dismiss the chemical weapons charge
as being unconstitutional, but both motions were denied.29 In the end,
Bond pleaded guilty to all charges and received a sentence of six years
in prison, five years of supervised release, a $2000 fine and restitution of
$9902.79, but she reserved her right to appeal.o
The grand jury's use of the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weap-
ons and on Their Destruction ("Chemical Weapons Convention" or
"CWC") was an unusual tactic that took jurisdiction over Bond's attacks
on Haynes out of the hands of the state of Pennsylvania and into the
federal court system, adding to the charges Bond already faced for mail
theft, a federal offense.3 1 Being charged under the CWC resulted in a
much longer sentence than what Bond otherwise would have received in
state court.32
The decision to use the CWC was also intriguing from a conflict of
laws standpoint. In this case, there is no true "conflict" to be found; the
23. Bond, 581 F.3d at 132.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Brief for Respondent at 4, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
29. Bond, 581 F.3d at 133.
30. Id.
31. Liptak, supra note 3.
32. Bond's lawyer, Paul D. Clement, stated that if Bond had been prosecuted in state court
under Pennsylvania law instead, she would have received a sentence of only three months to two
years in jail, as opposed to the six year sentence she received in federal court. Id.
2012]1 571
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CWC Implementation Act, as a federal statute, preempts state law under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution so long as it is
constitutionally valid.33 As implemented, however, the CWC Implemen-
tation Act was not the most logical or efficient choice of law in this case.
From a purely territorial point of view, putting aside the
Supremacy Clause, the state law of Pennsylvania seems the best choice
of applicable laws. Haynes and Bond, as Pennsylvania residents, 3 5 share
a common domicile. Bond's theft of the chemicals from her employer
occurred in Pennsylvania, as did her attempted poisoning of Haynes.36
The only potential interstate aspect of the case is Bond's purchase of
toxic chemicals over the Internet,3 but this is a tenuous link outside of
the state as the purchase of potassium dichromate is not in itself illegal,
unlike Bond's actual use of that chemical on Haynes in Pennsylvania.3 8
A Brainerd Currie-style "interest analysis" approach3 9 to Bond
would also find that the state of Pennsylvania has a strong interest in
applying its own law when compared to the federal government. After
all, the Tenth Amendment indirectly grants police power to the states,
with the federal government only able to regulate matters that fall under
police power as an exercise of the Commerce Clause or other constitu-
tional provisions.4 0 Pennsylvania can therefore demonstrate an interest
in applying its own laws codifying its police power, both for the protec-
tion of an injured resident and for the prosecution of a resident defen-
dant. In contrast, the federal government's interests are more muted,
involving adherence to treaty obligations and national defense.
A. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
Bond's chemical weapons charges were violations of the CWC
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 315-320 (1992).
35. Bill Mears, High Court to Hear Case of Woman Convicted of Chemical Weapon Crimes,
CNN (Feb. 22, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/20 11/CRIME/02/21/us.scotus.toxic.love.
36. Id.
37. Bond v. United States, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009).
38. While the purchase of potassium dichromate represents a minor contact outside of
Pennsylvania, this would likely still be enough for a federal law to have jurisdiction over Bond
under the Commerce Clause, as "transportation for others, as an independent business, is
commerce, irrespective of the purpose to sell or retain the goods which the owner may entertain
with regard to them after they shall have been delivered." Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case),
188 U.S. 321, 352 (1903) (citing Hanley v. Kan. City S. R.R. Corp., 187 U.S. 617 (1903)).
39. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DuKE L.J. 171.
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). Justice Rehnquist stated in his
majority opinion that "to uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."
572 [Vol. 66:567
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Implementation Act of 1998,41 which codified the United States' respon-
sibilities as a signing party to the CWC.4 2 The CWC requires signing
parties to refrain from the use or manufacture of chemical weapons, and
to destroy existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as verified by the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, an independent
agency headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands.4 3
The CWC, however, also requires signing parties to make certain
changes to domestic law. To further the CWC's goal of eliminating the
use of chemical weapons, signing parties must make it an illegal act for
any "natural and legal person" within the territory of the signing party to
use, create, or stockpile chemical weapons." The definition of "chemi-
cal weapon" under the CWC is extremely broad: "toxic chemicals" and
munitions intended to disperse them, where a "toxic chemical" is "[a]ny
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or ani-
mals."4 5 Under this definition, the use of almost any chemical-even
something as commonplace as bleach-could constitute an attack with a
chemical weapon.46
The CWC was signed by the United States and implemented
41. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (1998).
42. Brief for Respondent at 2, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
43. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. I, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974
U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC]. The CWC has been a great success, with 188 signing parties and
over 60% of all declared chemical weapon stockpiles verifiably destroyed. Press Release,
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Global Campaign to Destroy Chemical
Weapons Passes 60 Percent Mark (July 8, 2010).
44. CWC, supra note 43, art. VII, § 1.
45. Id., art. II, § 1-2.
46. As reported to the Senate by the U.S. representative to the committee drafting the CWC,
the CWC's broad definition of "chemical weapon" was not accidental:
With regard to the definition of "chemical weapons," the negotiators debated
whether to attempt to define specifically what chemical activities were to be
prohibited, or to prohibit all activities except for those specifically not prohibited.
The latter approach was chosen to facilitate verification and to preclude loopholes
with regard to unknown or future chemicals of possible concern.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearing on S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 37 (1994) [hereinafter CWC Hearing] (statement of Hon. Stephen
J. Ledogar, U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, U.S. Department of State).
The result of this approach is to make what constitutes a "chemical weapon" extremely broad, but
to lessen the potential for unintended consequences by making specific activities involving these
"chemical weapons" permissible, such as industrial or agricultural uses. The approach also allows
for simpler monitoring of "dual-use" chemicals, which have both industrial and wartime uses, by
"separat[ing] the military activities of concern from legitimate commercial and governmental
endeavors." CWC Hearing at 133 (statement of Amy Smithson, Director, Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.). This broad
definition made its way intact into the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
1998.
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through the use of federal legislation (the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion Implementation Act of 1998).47 Due to the CWC's broad and vague
definitions of "chemical weapons," the CWC Implementation Act gave
the federal government the ability to prosecute any criminal act utilizing
chemical agents, regardless of whether the act at hand would have been
within the federal government's jurisdiction prior to the signing of the
CWC.48
B. Bond's Appeals
At the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the Court
upheld the District Court's decision on a de novo review. The govern-
ment contended that the chemical weapons statute was constitutional, as
it was validly enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution as a law implementing the treaty power. Bond, however,
claimed the statute was unconstitutional, as it infringed upon police
power as set forth in the Tenth Amendment.49
Before proceeding upon the merits of Bond's argument, the Court
first had to decide if Bond even had standing to raise a Tenth Amend-
ment challenge to the CWC Implementation Act."o The Court recog-
nized a circuit split "on whether private parties have standing to
challenge a federal act on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.""1 The
Court followed the majority of the courts in concluding that a private
party acting independently of a state lacks standing to raise Tenth
Amendment claims, and affirmed the lower court's ruling.52
Bond next filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. The question presented was "[w]hether a criminal
defendant convicted under a federal statute has standing to challenge her
conviction on grounds that, as applied to her, the statute is beyond the
federal government's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the
Tenth Amendment."" The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October
47. Brief for Respondent at 2, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
48. Despite this broad ability to prosecute, Bond is in fact the first time that the CWC
Implementation Act has been applied in the United States to an actual use of a "chemical
weapon." Previous cases citing the CWC Implementation Act have dealt with the destruction of
government-owned chemical weapons or provisions providing exceptions to an automatic stay in
bankruptcy proceedings for organizations enforcing the CWC. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Gates, 499
F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Dolen, 265 B.R. 471 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
49. Bond v. United States, 581 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2009).
50. Id. at 135.
51. Id. at 136.
52. Id. at 137.
53. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (Apr. 9, 2010).
[Vol. 66:567574
FILLING IN THE GAPS
12, 20 10.54 Unexpectedly, the United States conceded in its brief that
Bond had standing "to defend herself by arguing that the statute under
which she is being prosecuted was beyond Congress's Article I authority
to enact."5 5 This represented a reversal of the United States' position
during the initial appeal. The United States asked that the Court "grant
the petition, vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand for
further proceedings in light of the position of the United States asserted
in this brief."56 Oral arguments were heard on February 21, 2011, and
the Court reached a decision on June 16, 2011, holding that Bond has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which she
was convicted and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals without
addressing the merits of Bond's argument.5 7 As a result, the Third Cir-
cuit will now have to address the constitutionality of the CWC Imple-
mentation Act."
IHI. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF TREATIES
A. Judicial Analysis of the Treaty Power
The Supreme Court's decision resolved the case simply, by concur-
ring with the two parties on the standing issue and reversing the lower
court's decision.5 9 The scope of the treaty power, however, is an impor-
tant, increasingly troubled issue that has reemerged since Missouri v.
Holland, the last decisive case on the matter.6 0
In Holland, the United States and Great Britain, on behalf of
Canada, agreed upon a treaty that would provide protection to birds dur-
ing their migration through North America in order to prevent extermi-
nation.' The two parties agreed to pass legislation in their respective
countries in order to carry out the treaty. The resulting statutes made it a
54. Lyle Denniston, Counsel Named for Bond Case, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 10, 2010, 1:56 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/201 0/11/counsel-for-bond-case.
55. Brief for Respondent at 6, Bond, No. 09-1227 (July 9, 2010).
56. Id.
57. Bond, No. 09-1227, slip op. at 1-2 (June 16, 2011)
58. Should the Third Circuit uphold the statute's constitutionality, Bond could re-petition for
a writ of certiorari, the acceptance of which would be at the Supreme Court's discretion.
59. The Supreme Court does not have to render a decision in accordance with only the
question presented in the petition. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (2010), http://
www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010RulesoftheCourt.pdf. Rule 14(1)(a) states "[tIhe statement of
any question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein.
Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court." Since the United States conceded the question presented, the question of whether
Congress overstepped its implementation abilities in regard to the treaty power would still be
"fairly included therein." The Court thus could have granted plenary review and taken this
opportunity to readdress the treaty power and its limitations.
60. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
61. Id. at 431. The treaty was signed on December 8, 1916.
2012]1 575
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crime to kill, capture, or sell any of the birds protected by the terms of
the treaty. 62 The case eventually came before the Supreme Court when
Missouri alleged that the statute was unconstitutional, because it inter-
fered with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.6 3
In his opinion for the seven-member majority, Justice Holmes
wrote: "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency
for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with
but that a treaty followed by such an act could . . . ."6 Holmes' decision
set an important precedent on the scope of the treaty power, which has
yet to be overturned. Treaties were explicitly declared "the supreme law
of the land . .. when made under the authority of the United States," and
in cases where a given matter is generally regulated by states, Holland
held that "a treaty may override [the states'] power." 65
The decision in Holland also made the Supreme Court the official
arbiter of what limitations, if any, existed on the scope of the treaty
power. Holland continues to be the starting point for discussions over
potential approaches to integrating federalist protections into the making
of treaties.
While Holmes' decision reiterated the unparalleled scope of the
treaty power, it was not entirely without limitations. "We do not mean to
imply," stated Holmes, "that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way."6 6 The
62. Id. at 430-31. In the United States, the implementing statute was known as the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918.
63. Id. at 431.
64. Justice Holmes did not define what "matters" he was referring to, stating only that any
limitations on the treaty power cannot be found by analyzing "the authority of the United States."
Instead, these matters "must be ascertained in a different way," another phrase Justice Holmes
neglected to elaborate upon. Id. at 433.
65. Id. at 433-34. In making these statements, Justice Holmes was simply repeating the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. While this clause may seem to settle the issue once and for all, the
situation is in fact more complicated. Treaties may be the supreme law of the land, but the
Supremacy Clause makes no distinction between treaties and the laws enacted by Congress to
implement them. Furthermore, no provision of the Constitution is absolute in itself. The
Commerce Clause, for example, allows the federal government to regulate interstate commerce,
but "in our modem world, no person or institution but the most hardily self-sufficient is free from
possessing some amount of goods that have, at one point in time, traveled interstate;" a truly
unlimited Commerce Clause power would thus grant the federal government the ability to regulate
nearly anything, in violation of other constitutional provisions like the Tenth Amendment. United
States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2003).
66. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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pursuit of this "different way" has ultimately led to two schools of
thought regarding judicial limitation of the treaty power: the Nationalists
and the New Federalists.
B. Nationalists, New Federalists, and the Changing
Nature of Treaties
Scholarly debate about the treaty power has largely focused on
judicial restrictions. Under the Constitution, the treaty power gives the
executive, with the agreement of two-thirds of the Senate, the power to
make international agreements, so long as those agreements do not con-
flict with the structure of the Constitution itself.6 7 The crux of the mat-
ter, though, is to what degree Congress can pass legislation to implement
such international agreements. This question has led to two camps with
distinct approaches to judicial limits on the treaty power: the National-
ists and the New Federalists.
The Nationalists believe that the issue of Congressional power
under the Article II treaty power was decisively settled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, and that treaties which do not
seek to overwrite the Constitution face few limitations. 6 8 It is an argu-
ment that finds its basis in the very text of the Constitution. Treaty-
making is a power explicitly delegated to the executive branch, and the
states are prohibited from forming treaties. 69 Nationalists rely on the
"Necessary and Proper Clause" of the U.S. Constitution"o to uphold
Congress' nearly unlimited legislative scope when acting in concert with
a treaty. The Nationalists believe that if a treaty has been constitutionally
signed, then Congress, in enacting implementing legislation, is merely
doing what is "necessary and proper" for carrying the treaty into
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion)
("no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."). Reid, however, seems largely
focused on the rights of individuals affected by a treaty, while being relatively unconcerned about
federalism. Later in his opinion, Justice Black states that "[t]here is nothing in Missouri v. Holland
which is contrary to the position taken here. . . . To the extent that the United States can validly
make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power to the National Government
and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier." Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (citation omitted).
68. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1330. Even after Holland, treaties may not change the
fundamental nature of the Constitution-e.g. conflict with the Bill of Rights, re-assign the powers
of the various branches of government, or create a monarchy.
69. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power ... to make Treaties
..... ); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations .... ); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation .... ).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.").
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execution.7 '
There are also a number of policy justifications for the Nationalist
viewpoint. Perhaps the most pronounced is the "one voice" argument-
that the United States must act as a singular entity with regard to foreign
nations, since control of foreign affairs is a power granted specifically to
the federal government at the expense of the states. 72 To create strict
limitations in the treaty power would weaken the ability of the federal
government to conduct foreign affairs, making the federal government a
representative of fifty separate state governments rather than a single,
unified voice.
The Nationalist approach to the treaty power is not without its
flaws. Detractors of the "one voice" argument point to the recent history
of United States treaties, in which several treaties were signed only after
the President or Senate sought provisions allowing for deference to fed-
eralism in implementation;74 despite non-unilateral implementation, the
federal government is still the only voice representing the United States
in matters arising from these treaties. Furthermore, critics fear that an
effectively unlimited treaty power could also allow Congress to increase
the scope of its own powers through the use of treaties.
In contrast, the New Federalists argue that treaty-implementing leg-
71. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1335.
72. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (holding that
"the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."); Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (stating that the President
holds the "vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations."); U.S. CONsT. art
I, § 10, cl. 1.
73. These fears were a real concern during the Articles of Confederation period, in which the
Continental Congress had power over foreign relations but not foreign commerce, leading to a
potential situation where a lack of state implementation might cause signed treaty obligations not
to be upheld. John Jay exemplified the belief that a single national representative in foreign affairs
was a necessity:
Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws
of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,
whereas,-adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in
three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent.
THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay).
74. An example of deference to federalism can be seen in the U.N. Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, which the United States joined on November 3, 2005, but only
after making a reservation stating that the federal government would be unable to prosecute
"purely local" offenses due to the lack of interstate activity. U.N. Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 335, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; full text of
U.S. reservation available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspxsrc=TREATY&mtdsg
no=XVIII- 12&chapter-l 8&lang=EN.
75. See Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 1870-71. This concern has been made real in
international agreements that enabled Congress to enact federal legislation via the treaty power to
encroach upon police power, regardless of whether or not such implementing legislation is within
the scope of the Commerce Clause.
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islation is subject to the same broadly defined federalism limitations as
all other federal legislation. New Federalists point to recent Supreme
Court cases like New York v. United States,76 United States v. Lopez,77
Printz v. United States,8 and United States v. Morrison" that have held
that the federal government possesses only the powers enumerated or
delegated to it in the Constitution.s0 New Federalists argue that Holland,
by failing to recognize federalism limitations inherent in the federal gov-
ernment's structure, was decided incorrectly, and push for various judi-
cial methods of limiting the scope of the treaty power.
Two common approaches for such limits are the use of subject-
matter limitations, allowing treaties only for matters of "international
concern," 81 and Tenth Amendment limitations, under which treaty-
implementing legislation may only be enacted if it would be valid fed-
eral law even without a treaty.82 A newer, related area of New Federalist
inquiry concerns the distinction between "self-executing" treaties (which
require no additional legislation) and "non-self-executing" treaties
(which require Congress to pass legislation before entering into effect)."
New Federalists see non-self-executing treaties as an area of primary
concern since they require action on the part of Congress, which directly
calls into question the scope of federal legislative power under the treaty
76. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
77. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
78. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
79. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
80. Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 392
(1998). This is an oversimplification of federalism issues, of course. The federal system requires
that the federal and state governments divide power between themselves, but there are multiple
ways in which this division could occur.
The boundaries of the powers granted to the federal government by the U.S. Constitution are
fluid, expanding and contracting over time. New York, Lopez, Printz, and Morrison were followed
by Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), which reversed the trend of the previous four cases of
constraining the Commerce Clause by holding that Congress could regulate the private growth of
marijuana despite the lack of a direct connection to interstate commerce, on the grounds that such
marijuana would inevitably be drawn toward the interstate market.
Perhaps the most useful concept in understanding the intricacies of federalism in the context
of this discussion is the notion that "[flederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from
the diffusion of sovereign power." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991). States'
rights is therefore not an end in and of itself, but rather a means by which the Constitution
attempts to safeguard individual rights from a "tyrannical" government, whether federal or state.
81. Bradley, supra note 80, at 429-30.
82. Id. at 426-27. Generally, in the context of this discussion, any mention of the New
Federalist approach will reference attempts to limit the treaty power through the Tenth
Amendment, not subject matter limitations, as subject matter limitations raise an entirely separate
set of issues that will not be discussed here, such as the definition of what truly constitutes
"international" concern.
83. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Nationalism, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1601 (2008).
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The Nationalist view of treaty power, however, has been dominant
since the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, and the
Court has never challenged a treaty on federalism grounds." This
existing practice in treaties is a significant hurdle for New Federalists to
overcome.
As a second hurdle, a key element of the New Federalist vision of
the treaty power is the overturning (or substantial modification) of Hol-
land.86 The Supreme Court, however, seems reluctant to revisit Holland.
The Court has cited Holland favorably in recent cases." Furthermore,
the Court has recently held that the federal government's foreign policy
powers may trump state law, re-emphasizing the importance of the "one
voice" argument." Even Medell(n v. Texas, which held that the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR") was not a self-executing
treaty and that as a result, the President had no authority to enforce its
provisions, made no reference to the constitutionality of any legislation
Congress might pass to formally implement the VCCR."
Finally, the New Federalists face a problem of definitions. Subject-
matter limitations suffer from the blurred lines between "international"
and "domestic" issues.90 Louis Henkin has argued that "every treaty,
regardless of subject, serves the external purposes of the United States;"
there is no clear way for the Supreme Court to decide which specific
subjects are truly "international" and which are purely "domestic." 91
Several treaties that may have beneficial effects for the nation as a whole
fall into this gray area. As an example, human rights treaties, which may
help safeguard United States citizens abroad, generally require signing
84. See Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 1928-29.
85. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1354-55.
86. See Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 1869.
87. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1353. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)
(dealing with Congress' ability under the treaty power and Indian Commerce Clause to dictate the
extent of Indian tribes' jurisdiction on criminal matters); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (concerning hunting and fishing rights on lands the
Chippewa ceded to the United States via treaty in 1837). In Lara, Justice Thomas stated in his
concurrence that his fellow Justices seemed to believe "the treaty power ... provide[s] Congress
with free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics that could potentially implicate some
unspecified treaty." 541 U.S. at 225 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413, 424 (2003) (holding that a
California statute was invalid due to conflicts with executive foreign policy).
89. 552 U.S. 491, 498-99 (2008). In his opinion for the majority, Justice Roberts stated that
"our Framers . . . recognized that treaties could create federal law", and noted that "Congress is up
to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those involving complex commercial
disputes." Id. at 515, 521.
90. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1355.
91. Louis Henkin, "International Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63
AM. J. INTL. L. 272, 276-77 (1969).
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countries to implement legislation criminalizing human rights abuses,
which could be seen to interfere with the states' police power. 9 2 Strict
adherence to New Federalist restraints on the treaty power could effec-
tively prevent the United States from ever taking part in human rights,
environmental, or legal harmonization treaties.
One factor with implications for both the Nationalist and New Fed-
eralist approaches is the changing nature of treaties. In the early years of
the Constitution, treaties were generally conducted between two coun-
tries, and concerned matters that could easily be classified as "interna-
tional concerns," such as peace treaties or treaties dealing with the
treatment of each country's citizens in the territories of the other." The
modem treaty, however, has reached into the realm of private interna-
tional law.
Increasingly, treaties take the form of agreements between multiple
countries to treat their own citizens in a particular way. Examples of this
process include human rights treaties, where each country outlaws cer-
tain human rights abuses within its territory; environmental treaties, in
which each country regulates its own industrial output; and legal harmo-
nization treaties, which serve to create uniform legal procedures for pri-
vate law issues such as wills, contracts, and arbitral awards.94 The line
between "international" and "domestic" becomes increasingly blurred in
these forms of treaty. While the United States could obviously derive
benefit from these treaties-better treatment of U.S. citizens abroad,
improved environmental conditions, or more efficient international legal
procedures-the legislation required to implement such treaties is purely
domestic, with little to no treatment of foreign citizens.
Scholars from both camps attempt to use the text and structure of
the Constitution, records of debates over the wording and scope of the
Constitution, and the personal letters of the Framers to argue for a
Nationalist or New Federalist intent for Article II.9 The modern treaty,
however, is so different from anything the Framers would have com-
monly experienced that historical arguments for the scope of the treaty
power may simply not carry much weight. Thomas Jefferson in particu-
lar wrote that a treaty "must concern the foreign nation party to the con-
92. Bradley, supra note 80, at 397, 444.
93. See Golove, supra note 13.
94. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966; United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992; Convention on the Law Applicable
to Trusts and on Their Recognition, Jul. 1, 1985, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=
conventions.text&cid=59
95. See generally Golove, supra note 13, Rosenkranz, supra note 13, Bradley, supra note 80.
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tract."9 6 As mentioned earlier, the role of the treaty power has changed
since Holland, with an increase in treaties that "make laws for the peo-
ple of the United States in their internal concerns."" Indeed, the Ameri-
can Law Institute acknowledged this change in the nature of treaties by
writing in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States that "contrary to what was once suggested, the Constitu-
tion does not require that an international agreement deal only with
'matters of international concern.' "98
As the Nationalists and New Federalists demonstrate, judicially
enforced limitations on the treaty power may not be capable of integrat-
ing federalist protections while also permitting broad and effective for-
eign policy actions by the federal government. Since the treaty-making
power is explicitly delegated to the President, the executive branch may
be an alternative source for limitations of the treaty power.
IV. EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF THE TREATY POWER
A. The Role of the Executive Branch in Treaty-Making
The executive branch is sensitive to federalism concerns, and
treaty-making is rarely undertaken without at least some thought to a
treaty's effect on the states.9 In determining how to fit federalism into a
given treaty, the executive utilizes a set of approaches termed "executive
federalism." 0 For some treaties, the executive may find swift national
implementation of a treaty to be of the utmost importance, and as a
result the executive may choose to make no accommodations to federal-
ism.1 o' In other cases, the executive may refuse to sign a treaty, finding
that the treaty would too strongly interfere with the states."o2
Between these two extremes, the executive has several other
options in making a treaty. The executive may seek to modify a treaty
before signing it, either through clauses that explicitly allow for different
ratification processes for federal states ("federal state clauses") or
through clarifications that clearly separate federal and state responsibili-
96. Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY
WRITINOs 420 (Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., 1988).
97. Charles Evans Hughes, 23 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 196 (1929).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302
cmt. c (1987)
99. See Hollis, supra note 15.
100. Id. at 1361.
101. Id. at 1371. This would entail the President signing a treaty with a two-thirds vote of the
Senate, to then be implemented as federal legislation regardless of any overlap with areas of state
concern.
102. Id. at 1373. As an example, President Eisenhower refused to join human rights treaties
that would have required federal legislation affecting the police power.
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ties under a treaty. 103 The executive may sign a treaty, but with a reser-
vation, understanding, or declaration that notifies other signing parties
that the United States may not uphold all aspects of the treaty, generally
those aspects that implicate federalism.'" In certain cases, such as when
signing a treaty on a subject the law of the United States already
addresses, the executive may choose to limit the implementation of a
signed treaty by utilizing existing legislation that is "good enough" to
meet treaty obligations.10 5 Finally, the executive may sign a treaty but
limit its enforcement when federalism is threatened, asking states to
act in accordance with treaty obligations but not "compelling" them
to do so, in accordance with the Supreme Court's prohibition of
"commandeering."o106
Taken together, "executive federalism" represents a useful toolkit
for treaty creation and implementation. The executive possesses a range
of approaches to federalism issues, self-selecting the most appropriate
method for the treaty or goal at hand. "Executive federalism" also shows
the executive branch to be far more willing to self-regulate than the New
Federalists might believe. Each of the "executive federalism" methods
has been used to sign (or refuse to sign) a treaty, making the toolkit a
practical object and not merely a hypothetical exercise.
While the "executive federalism" system provides a wide range of
approaches under which the executive branch can form treaties, each
method has its own problems."0 7 This leaves the use of federal state
clauses in multilateral agreements as the most likely approach for main-
taining federalism in the treaty-making process.
103. Id. at 1374-78.
104. Id. at 1379-81.
105. Id. at 1382.
106. Id. at 1384-86. This prohibition can be found in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992). The approach of limiting enforcement can most clearly be seen in the events surrounding
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), in which the President urged Texas to reconsider
Medellfn's conviction in light of the ICJ's decision in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), but was powerless to force the state to do so.
107. Making no accommodations for federalism (i.e., enacting federal legislation alone to
implement treaties) may be appropriate in certain purely "international" contexts, but the
"international" increasingly intrudes upon the "domestic," and to do so in general evokes the spirit
of the New Federalist arguments against enhancing the scope of federal power. Rejecting treaties
on federalism grounds may be counterproductive to United States interests in widespread
ratification of multilateral agreements, sending a signal that the United States does not value the
subject matter of the treaty. Making reservations of consent to a treaty could have similar negative
effects, as the failure of the United States to fully ratify a given convention would make it less
likely that foreign governments would ratify in full. Similarly, the limiting of federal
implementation or execution of treaty obligations may raise questions among foreign states about
the United States' willingness to uphold its duties under a treaty, giving the United States less
bargaining power during treaty-making.
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B. Federal State Clauses and the Protection of Federalist Ideals
One method the executive may use to protect federalism in treaty
implementation is the use of "federal state clauses" in multilateral agree-
ments.108 What was quite possibly the first federal state clause was cre-
ated in 1919, in the Commission responsible for drafting the
Constitution of the International Labor Organization ("ILO").'09 In fact,
it was the American delegation that led the fight for an official recogni-
tion of federalism, arguing that such recognition was essential if the
United States were to join the ILO. 1 10 The federal state clause was, at its
essence, a compromise between the interests of unitary and federal
states."I'
The federal state clause went through several drafts, each time
changing its wording to remedy the conflicting interests of federal and
unitary states. Federal states worried that they would be unable to
uphold treaty obligations if their constituent states did not cooperate;
unitary states worried that the constituent states of federal states would
seek their own representation at the ILO, and that federal states would
be subject to less stringent treaty obligations.112
108. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1374-78.
109. Robert B. Looper, "Federal State" Clauses in Multi-Lateral Instruments, 32 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 162, 164 (1955-1956).
110. Id.
111. A unitary state consists of a single level of government, while a federal state is composed
of two or more interacting levels of government.
112. Under the original British proposal for the ILO, member states would be obligated to
ratify all ILO Conventions unless a concerned member state's legislature "actively expressed its
disapproval of ratification." The American delegation objected; in the United States, jurisdiction
over labor regulation belonged with the states and not the federal government, and since Missouri
v. Holland would not be decided until 1920, it would be impossible to guarantee United States
ratification of ILO Conventions.
A first draft of the federal state clause allowed federal states to leave ratification of a
Convention concerning matters over which constituent states had "power of legislation" to those
constituent states directly, absolving the federal state's government of responsibilities under the
Convention. The British delegation found this solution unworkable, arguing that to accept such a
clause would invite constituent territories of federal states like the United States, Australia, or
Canada to send their own delegates to 10 meetings. Delegates from Great Britain and Belgium
sought a compromise measure, and a second draft of the federal state clause was created on March
24, 1919:
In the case of a federal state, the power of which to enter into conventions on labour
matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of the Government of
such State to treat a draft convention to which such limitations apply as a
recommendation only, and the provisions of this article with respect to
recommendations shall apply in such case.
This draft clause was accepted by both the American and British delegations, and ultimately
became Article 19 of the ILO Constitution.
The clause only led to further disagreement, though, among unitary states. In practice, the
clause meant that unitary states were subject to harsher obligations than federal states, which
could treat conventions as mere recommendations instead. The nature of ILO Conventions was
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As a result of these disagreements, the ILO Delegation invited sev-
eral federal states to meet in Montreal in May 1946 to address deficien-
cies in the ILO Constitution, most notably the phrasing of the federal
state clause." 3 Several possibilities were considered, including the
removal of the federal state clause in its entirety; the transformation of
all Conventions into Recommendations, to put all states on an equal
footing; or even shifting responsibility for ratification to the constituents
of federal states directly, despite prohibitions in most federal constitu-
tions preventing constituent states from entering into treaties.l14 The end
result of the Montreal meetings was a re-working of the federal state
clause, focusing on "appropriateness" rather than limitations:
7. In the case of a federal State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) in respect of Conventions and Recommendations which the fed-
eral government regards as appropriate under its constitutional sys-
tem for federal action, the obligations of the federal State shall be the
same as those of Members which are not federal States;
(b) in respect of Conventions and Recommendations which the fed-
eral government regards as appropriate under its constitutional sys-
tem, in whole or in part, for action by the constituent states,
provinces, or cantons rather than for federal action, the federal gov-
ernment shall:
(i) make, in accordance with its Constitution and the Constitutions
of the states, provinces or cantons concerned, effective arrange-
ments for the reference of such Conventions and Recommenda-
tions not later than 18 months from the closing of the session of the
Conference to the appropriate federal, state, provincial or cantonal
authorities for the enactment of legislation or other action . . . .1
The federal state clause of the LO Constitution became largely subjec-
tive, allowing contracting federal states to determine how and to what
extent treaty obligations would best be implemented.
Having successfully fought for a federal state clause in the ILO
changing as well, addressing matters of social and cultural regulation that would put unitary states
at a disadvantage if forced to implement them while federal states treat them as recommendations.
Furthermore, questions loomed as to what truly constituted a federal state "the power of which to
enter into conventions . . . is subject to limitations." At the time of the ILO Constitution's
adoption, no federal state could meet this requirement; even Canada, which can only implement
treaties through the action of its constituent territories, is free to "enter into conventions" without
territorial interaction. After arguing for the insertion of a federal state clause, the United States did
not join the ILO until 1934, and even then it did not utilize the federal state clause to do so.
Looper, supra note 109, at 165-167, 169, 171, 176-77.
113. Id. at 180.
114. Id. at 180-81.
115. ILO Constitution, art. 19(7), as amended April 20, 1948, available at http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/constq.htm. This section, which became Article 19(7) of the revised ILO
Constitution, goes on to specify how federal states using Article 19(7)(b) above must
communicate with their constituent territories and with the ILO's leadership.
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Constitution, the United States, along with other federal states, sought
the inclusion of similar clauses in many other multilateral treaties.16
The form of this clause has changed over time, though. As an example,
the Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an Interna-
tional Will ("Washington Convention"), which was created in Washing-
ton, D.C. in 1973, contained the following clause as Article XIV:
1. If a State has two or more territorial units in which different sys-
tems of law apply in relation to matters respecting the form of wills,
it may at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, declare that
this Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one
or more of them, and may modify its declaration by submitting
another declaration at any time.
2. These declarations shall be notified to the Depositary Government
and shall state expressly the territorial units to which the Convention
applies.' 7
The language of the Washington Convention's federal state clause is
extremely broad compared to that found within the 1919 or 1946 ILO
Constitutions. Under the Washington Convention, federal states need
not make reference to either limitations or appropriateness; all that is
required is the presence of "different systems of law" in constituent
states."' This form of federal state clause also effectively allows indi-
vidual states within a federal state to ratify a treaty so long as the federal
government allows it, as the federal government could declare that the
treaty only applies to those states which have chosen to take part in the
treaty-creating a form of end-run around the constitutional prohibition
on U.S. states making treaties with foreign states.
The relative laxity of the Washington Convention federal state
clause led President Reagan to utilize a "two-tier" approach to its ratifi-
cation, based on the use of the federal state clause." 9 As wills are a
matter generally regulated by state governments, there was a concern
about whether the treaty would interfere too much in the state's role of
regulating the recognition of wills.' 2 0 Testators and attorneys customa-
rily consult state laws when drafting wills, and are not used to checking
for federal rules.' 2 ' It would be preferable, therefore, for the implemen-
116. See Looper, supra note 109, at 188.
117. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, art. XIV, Oct.
26, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1298.
118. Id.
119. Letter of Submittal from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to the 99th
Congress 2d Session (July 2, 1986), http://www.cabinetchone.com/website/will/message.html.
120. Letter of Submittal from George P. Shultz, Department of State, to Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States (June 4, 1986), http://www.cabinetchone.com/website/willmessage.
html.
121. Id.
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tation of the Washington Convention to occur primarily at the state
level.
Under the "two-tier" approach, the federal and state governments
would both pass legislation implementing separate portions of the
treaty.122 The Washington Convention could be broadly split into two
parts: the recognition of international wills created in foreign states, and
the creation of international wills by United States citizens.123 President
Reagan's plan was for the federal government to implement the recogni-
tion of international wills throughout the United States, as well as to
facilitate the creation of international wills by United States citizens
abroad.1 24 The state legislatures, in turn, would optionally pass legisla-
tion allowing state residents to create international wills.125 The federal
government prepared a model law, the Uniform International Wills Act,
for the state governments to follow, which could either be enacted as-is
or used as a basis for the drafting of state legislation.12 6
Using the federal state clause of the Washington Convention, the
United States would determine the extent to which the Convention's
obligations would apply to its territories, ensuring that international obli-
gations could be upheld.127 Without the federal state clause, this
approach would have been impossible, as the federal government would
have been held responsible for all obligations arising under the Wash-
ington Convention, regardless of the status of state implementations.
Ultimately, twenty states enacted the Uniform International Wills Act or
similar legislation.128 The federal government, however, never passed
the International Wills Act that would have guaranteed recognition of
international wills, meaning that the United States is still not a party to
the Washington Convention.129 Thus, while the Reagan "two tier" sys-
tem holds great promise, it has never been officially put to use.
To add further complications to the use of the Reagan "two tier"
system, not all federal state clauses have been so relaxed as the clause in
the Washington Convention. Consider, for example, the federal state
clause included in the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.13 o
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and Private International Law Treaties: A
Model for Accommodating Globalization, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1063, 1067 (2008).
129. Id. at 1066-67.
130. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 41, opened for signature Nov. 23,
2001, S. Exec. Rep. No. 109-06. The Cybercrime Convention's federal state clause (Article 41)
read as follows:
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Unlike the federal state clauses of the ILO Constitution or International
Will convention, the Cybercrime Convention federal state clause
restricts the ability of federal states to deviate from the obligations
placed on unitary states. Federal governments ratifying the treaty may
make reservations under Article 41(1), but they will still be tied to
"broad and effective law enforcement" with respect to the treaty.13 1
The recent wave of restrictions on federal state clauses, as exempli-
fied by the Cybercrime Convention, can sometimes lead to a loss of
bargaining power for federal states such as the United States. While
negotiating amendments to the World Health Organization International
Health Regulations, the United States argued for the inclusion of a fed-
eral state clause allowing for the division of implementation "consistent
with . . . [its] constitutionally mandated systems of government."1 3 2 The
request was denied, leaving the United States in a difficult position in
regard to federalism. Without the federal state clause, the Reagan "two-
tier" approach could not be used, and the federal government would
have to choose between leaving implementation to the states but drafting
a reservation from certain treaty obligations, or ignoring federalism and
ratifying the treaty in full, but exclusively at the federal level.
As these recent developments demonstrate, the United States can-
not rely upon federal state clauses being present in multilateral treaties,
and therefore similarly cannot rely upon the Reagan "two-tier" approach
for the protection of federalism in treaty implementation. There is, how-
ever, another way of allowing for state participation in treaty implemen-
tation without the need for federal state clauses: the "fill in the gaps"
approach.
1. A federal State may reserve the right to assume obligations under Chapter II of
this Convention consistent with its fundamental principles governing the
relationship between its central government and constituent States or other
similar territorial entities provided that it is still able to co-operate under Chapter
III.
2. When making a reservation under paragraph 1, a federal State may not apply the
terms of such reservation to exclude or substantially diminish its obligations to
provide for measures set forth in Chapter II. Overall, it shall provide for a broad
and effective law enforcement capability with respect to those measures.
3. With regard to the provisions of this Convention, the application of which comes
under the jurisdiction of constituent States or other similar territorial entities, that
are not obliged by the constitutional system of the federation to take legislative
measures, the federal government shall inform the competent authorities of such
States of the said provisions with its favourable opinion, encouraging them to
take appropriate action to give them effect.
131. Id., art. 41(2).
132. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1377.
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V. THE "FILL IN THE GAPS" APPROACH TO
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
As previously demonstrated, no current solution to the issues stem-
ming from Missouri v. Holland is fully appropriate. Judicial limitations,
the "executive federalism" system, and the use of federal state clauses
represent a variety of means for preserving federalism under the treaty
power, but each brings significant disadvantages in practice.
Each of the previous approaches also neglects a significant force in
the creation of treaties-the states themselves. While the states are pro-
hibited from forming treaties with foreign states directly, they are free to
implement multilateral agreements within their competence without
being an "official" signing party of a treaty. Consider, for example, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women ("CEDAW").'" While the United States signed CEDAW in
1980, no federal implementing legislation was ever enacted, and the
United States has never officially ratified the treaty as a result. 3 4
Despite this fact, by 2004, "forty-four U.S. cities, eighteen counties, and
sixteen states had passed or considered legislation relating to CEDAW,
with yet others contemplating action.""' If the United States ratified the
treaty, and Congress passed overarching CEDAW legislation, these
existing state implementations would create separate, overlapping imple-
mentations so long as they did not conflict with federal legislation.136
Municipal entities can also serve as implementers of foreign policy.
133. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 19 I.L.M. 33.
134. Resnik, supra note 13, at 1110.
135. Id.
136. Human rights treaties like CEDAW may represent the only practical way to provide
individuals rights that the Supreme Court has held are beyond the scope of Congress' powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court has used the "state action doctrine" to limit the
effectiveness of federal measures promulgated under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Morrison, the
Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment only allows the federal government to address the
actions of states and those individuals acting as representatives of the states, and does not "shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Morrison v. United States,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). This state action
requirement is not part of the text of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court has
continually interpreted this requirement as being implied, preventing effective implementation of
legislation like the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") at issue in Morrison.
Second, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment grants limited due process rights.
The Court held in Castle Rock v. Gonzales that Jessica Gonzales, a victim of domestic violence,
had no procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for the Castle Rock Police
Department's lack of enforcement of Gonzales' restraining order against her ex-husband, who
abducted and killed their three children. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). While Gonzales was able to bring
her case before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") due to the
United States' participation in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the
Commission's report finding violations of eight articles of the American Declaration was mostly a
symbolic victory, as the report had no legally binding effects on the United States. Lenahan v.
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What might be politically risky at the national level can often find
broader support at the local level; "[d]eep inside the local, one can often
see the global."' 37 Efforts to act in compliance with current international
treaties can often be implemented at the city level, and through trans-
local organizations such as the National League of Cities, these efforts
can have national or even global significance, providing "signals" to
Congress about popular opinion of treaties and promoting a "cooperative
federalism" where state action can inform or even implement federal
policy. 138
These state and municipal implementations serve as the basis for an
alternative approach to treaty implementation, the fill in the gaps
approach, that maintains federalist protections domestically while
presenting "one voice" and a unified ratification process to the interna-
tional community. Under the fill in the gaps approach, the federal gov-
ernment signs treaties via the President and a two-thirds majority of the
Senate as normal, and then provides the states with the option of imple-
menting non-federal aspects of treaties, subject to a generous time limit.
In turn, the federal government enacts legislation implementing the fed-
eral aspects of a treaty, while simultaneously drafting model legislation
for the states to apply, adjust, or ignore as they see fit. At the end of the
state legislation time limit, the model legislation becomes federal law,
applying to all states that have not enacted their own implementation of
United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, available at http://www.
oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/201 1/USPUl2626EN.doc.
As a result of these limitations, effective human rights legislation likely requires the use of
the treaty power's broad scope under Holland. While the use of the treaty power to pass human
rights legislation has been highly controversial, the fill in the gaps approach presented below
could present a workable compromise. If the federal government had implemented CEDAW, the
combination of state and federal implementations would likely have led to different results in
Castle Rock and Morrison.
137. Resnik, supra note 13, at 1124. This does not always result in increased local participation
in foreign affairs, as can be seen in Oklahoma (and twenty other states) attempting to enact
controversial legislation that would prevent judges from using international law sources in their
decisions, isolating the local from the global. See Mark Schlachtenhaufen, CAIR-OK Launches
Anti-Sharia Bill Campaign, EDMOND SUN, Mar. 18, 2011, http://www.edmondsun.com/locall
x740880415/CAIR-OK-launches-anti-Sharia-bill-campaign.
138. Resnik, supra note 13, at 1138, 1133-34. Johanna Kalb has taken this concept further in
her idea of "dynamic federalism," in which the states must participate when the federal
government creates a space for state implementation of treaties. Where Kalb differs from my fill
in the gaps approach is in her attitude toward enforcement. Under dynamic federalism, the federal
government delegates implementation entirely to the states, with the federal government assuming
the position of reviewer of state actions in comparison to a "floor" of enforcement and holding the
states responsible when they fail to meet that floor. Kalb, supra note 13, at 1055-59. In contrast,
the fill in the gaps approach below takes a more lenient attitude toward state participation, offering
states the opportunity to draft local solutions to the problem of treaty implementation but also
allowing states to "opt out" of enforcement burdens for matters that they do not find important or
prudent to address at the state level.
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the treaty's obligations. The end result is a system in which states can
take control of the domestic implications of treaty obligations, while still
allowing the federal government to ratify treaties as a singular entity
without resorting to reservations or the use of federal state clauses. The
spirit of federalism is thereby preserved through the use of the very tool
that allows the federal government to disregard federalism concerns-
the Supreme Court's holding in Missouri v. Holland.
The fill in the gaps approach derives its legitimacy from Holland's
statement that the treaty power allows Congress to pass any legislation
necessary for the implementation of a treaty.' Under fill in the gaps,
the federal government delegates the implementation of certain aspects
of a signed treaty to the states, with Congress using its abilities under
Holland and the treaty power to bring non-implementing states into line
with the federal government's international treaty obligations. The result
is an executive branch free to make foreign policy decisions as needed
without subject matter or execution limitations, and state governments
which are encouraged to take an active part in the foreign policy of the
United States through their own domestic legislation.
This approach represents a compromise designed to bridge the
flaws in the Nationalist and New Federalist viewpoints. Fill in the gaps
puts an end to the Nationalist contention that state involvement in treaty-
making would lead to the President representing fifty state governments
rather than "one United States," 4 0 because the federal government's
"fallback" legislation allows the President and Senate to conclude trea-
ties without fear that the United States will be held to account for an
individual state's failure to implement treaty provisions. It also
addresses the New Federalist concerns about unchecked expansion of
congressional powerl4 1 by providing each state with the opportunity to
legislatively prevent Congress from encroaching upon that state's areas
of jurisdiction. Under fill in the gaps, Congress only gains the ability to
enact treaty-implementing legislation that disregards the Tenth Amend-
ment in the absence of state action.
This proposal may seem to limit federalism, by "commandeering"
the states into choosing between enacting burdensome state legislation
on the one hand or losing the ability to control matters occurring within
their own borders on the other. The closest analogy is New York v.
United States142, in which states like New York were similarly forced to
choose between two potentially disadvantageous outcomes. In New
139. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
140. Golove, supra note 13, at 1276.
141. Bradley, supra note 80, at 450.
142. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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York, the Supreme Court addressed the federal Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act, which created three incentives for states
to regulate the disposal of nuclear waste.' 4 3
Most states complied with the Act by joining a regional compact,
delivering their waste to a receiver state that would collect surcharges
for its trouble.'4 4 Rather than join a compact, New York attempted to
comply by constructing its own disposal facility, but residents of the five
proposed disposal sites opposed the move."' As a result, New York was
placed in a difficult situation: it could pay disposal surcharges to a
receiver state, or take title to its waste and face liability for damages. In
either case, New York would be forced to exert its state resources in
furtherance of a federal regulation program.
The Supreme Court agreed, finding the "take title" provision
unconstitutional for "commandeering" state governments into imple-
menting federal regulation, "cross[ing] the line distinguishing encour-
agement from coercion."14 > The central problem described in the
opinion was the lack of alternatives. States could not decline to adminis-
ter the federal government's regulatory program, since the state would
be forced to either implement federal legislation at the state level or be
liable under federal law.14 7
The fill in the gaps approach, however, is quite different from the
situation the states faced in New York, and actually enhances federalism
protections. Unlike New York, the fill in the gaps approach allows states
to completely opt out of the burden of enforcing federal treaty obliga-
tions. Federal "fallback" legislation, when put into effect for states that
have chosen not to create their own implementing legislation, would be
enforced at the federal level. The states could therefore be free of the
burden to enforce treaty obligations.14 8 In New York, the federal govern-
ment mandated that the states enact regulation; here, the federal govern-
143. The first two incentives allowed states to collect surcharges from other states for receiving
shipments of nuclear waste, and to raise surcharges or deny imports for states that failed to comply
with the statute. The third incentive was referred to as the "take title" provision, and required
states which were unable to dispose of all radioactive waste generated in their own state to take
title to that waste and be liable for any damages resulting from it. The Act itself was "based
largely on a proposal submitted by the National Governors' Association," another example of
federal policy originating at the state level. Id. at 151, 153-54.
144. "In the seven years since the [Amendments] Act took effect, Congress has approved nine
regional compacts, encompassing 42 of the states." Id. at 154.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 175.
147. "No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress." Id. at
177.
148. The states would, however, be prevented from enacting legislation that conflicts with
federal treaty obligations. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that
executive agreements and treaties may pre-empt conflicting state law).
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ment provides states the opportunity to do so, if they wish to implement
a plan that better matches their local situation and concerns.
By choosing not to implement treaty obligations themselves, states
would both lose the ability to influence certain activities within their
borders and acquiesce to the federal government's proposed implemen-
tation of the treaty. "Commandeering" does not become a concern
because the federal government is not forcing the states to take a particu-
lar action.149 Instead, the states may either choose to create their own
legislation or to leave treaty compliance entirely to the federal govern-
ment-the "critical alternative" missing in New York.'
At a glance, this approach may also seem burdensome to the federal
government. The states may seek to avoid costly enforcement of treaty
obligations by leaving all implementing legislation and enforcement
responsibility to the federal government. This is, however, precisely the
way in which most current treaties have been implemented. The 1998
Act implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention assigned respon-
sibility for prosecuting persons making, using, or stockpiling chemical
weapons entirely to the federal government, with no state interaction at
all."'1 Even if only a small number of states ultimately create their own
implementing legislation, this would still represent a reduction, rather
than an increase, in the enforcement burdens of the federal government.
Consider, for example, the treaty provision at issue in Medellin v.
Texas.15 2 There, Article 36 of the VCCR required law enforcement offi-
cials to contact an arrested foreign national's consulate, an obligation to
which the state of Texas objected.1 13 If the VCCR had been ratified
using a fill in the gaps approach, Texas could have simply opted out of
passing state legislation implementing the VCCR, leaving implementa-
tion to the federal government." Enforcement at the federal level, how-
149. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
150. New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77.
151. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998).
152. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
153. Id. at 497-98.
154. In the same manner, other states could have "opted in" to state implementation. Governor
Brad Henry of Oklahoma, for example, stated that the VCCR was "important in protecting the
rights of American citizens abroad," and commuted Osbaldo Torres' death sentence to life without
possibility of parole after the ICJ's decision in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). Medellin, 552 U.S. at 537.
Note also that applying the fill in the gaps approach to the VCCR explicitly assumes that it is
a non-self-executing treaty. The critical issue in Medellin was not whether or not the federal
government had the power to implement VCCR legislation, but whether the VCCR represented a
self-executing treaty that the President could demand enforcement of without federal
implementing legislation. Federal implementation of human rights treaties is politically risky
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ever, would be quite simple. Rather than monitoring all arrests in the
state and contacting embassies as needed, the federal government could
simply enact as "fallback" legislation the ability for foreign nationals
denied their rights under Article 36 to appeal their convictions in federal
courts. States that implemented their own Article 36 provisions could
handle such appeals internally according to state law, while those states
that did not would find their criminal cases against foreign nationals
increasingly being appealed to federal courts. This distinction would
allow states to tailor their approaches to treaty obligations based on their
particular circumstances. States which arrest a large number of foreign
nationals would likely be incentivized to pass state legislation in order to
maintain tighter control over activities occurring within their borders,
while states in which foreign nationals are rarely arrested could essen-
tially transfer cases against foreign nationals, along with the burden of
observing VCCR obligations, to the federal government by choosing not
to implement the treaty.
How might fill in the gaps have applied to Bond? If the ratification
of the CWC had utilized this approach, the federal government could
have passed legislation ensuring the declaration and verified destruction
of its own chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as the prosecution of
individuals creating, using, or stockpiling chemical weapons in non-state
U.S. territories. At the same time, the federal government would draft
model legislation for the states, defining chemical weapons and setting
out the required crimes and punishments. States would then be free to
enact or modify the proposed model legislation, to draft entirely new
legislation that still meets the requirements of the treaty, or to leave
implementation of the CWC within the state entirely to the federal gov-
ernment. At the end of the state legislation time period, the federal gov-
ernment would enact "fallback" legislation, ensuring treaty compliance
in all states that had not implemented their own legislation."'
If Pennsylvania had enacted its own CWC legislation criminalizing
chemical weapons use, Bond could have been charged at the state level
instead. Pennsylvania would have been free to set its own sentencing
terms as well, since the CWC merely required "enacting penal legisla-
tion" without minimum or even recommended sentencing guidelines.'"'
under the current treaty framework, as it generally entails federal interference in state police
power. A fill in the gaps approach would hopefully provide the federal government with the
ability to put human rights treaty obligations into federal law without fear of offending state
governments, making the self-executing / non-self-executing distinction less important.
155. The state legislation time period mentioned here need not be final, either; it would most
likely be in the federal government's best interest to allow states which had chosen not to
implement treaty obligations to do so even after the fallback legislation goes into effect.
156. CWC, supra note 43, art. VII, § 1.
[Vol. 66:567594
FILLING IN THE GAPS
Indeed, the door would be open for states to implement a sliding scale of
punishments based on severity, an idea that the federal CWC Implemen-
tation Act did not address. Pennsylvania could have set chemical weap-
ons sentencing for acts like Bond's in line with similar state offenses,
giving Bond a sentence of up to two years imprisonment and eliminating
one of the main pillars of her argument-the disparity between federal
and state sentencing terms.
VI. CONCLUSION
From its earliest roots in the drafting of the United States Constitu-
tion, the treaty power has had a long and storied history, with spirited
debate from all sides. For all of its criticisms, the modem treaty power is
not some form of monster; it is merely the result of attempts to unite
disparate ideals in the service of the nation. On one hand, the treaty
power attempts to provide the federal government with the power to
make international agreements that are beneficial to the United States,
whether peace treaties, coalitions of nations, or multilateral private inter-
national law agreements. On the other hand, the treaty power seeks to fit
within the structure of the Constitution, a structure that establishes a
federal government of limited and enumerated powers. Providing for-
eign policy power while remaining sensitive to federalism has proven to
be a difficult balancing act, one that the Supreme Court's decision in
Holland only barely addressed.
Holland embodied Nationalist conceptions of the treaty power. For-
eign policy was placed at the forefront of the treaty power, and federal-
ism was left behind. Holland was not purely Nationalist, as Justice
Holmes stated that "[w]e do not mean to imply that there are no qualifi-
cations on the treaty-making power."' When Justice Holmes stated that
limitations on the treaty power must be "ascertained in a different
way,"' without elucidating what that "way" might entail, he opened
the door to a range of possible limitations on the treaty power.
One such "way" could be to find limitations in the subject matter of
treaties, or another "way" could be through Congress' power to imple-
ment treaties. These New Federalist ideas are attractive because of their
preservation of the ideal of federalism within the federal government's
actions. Judicial limitations, however, can only achieve so much without
upsetting the delicate balance of foreign policy power and federalism.
Strict limits on the treaty power could throw it out of equilibrium, pro-
tecting states' rights so strongly that the United States suffers on the
international stage as a result.
157. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
158. Id.
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An additional "way" could be to look beyond the courts to find the
limits of the treaty power. The treaty power, granted to the executive
branch by Article II of the United States Constitution, could perhaps best
be limited through the very executive branch tasked with its use. This
change of source is the basis of "executive federalism," the idea that the
executive can choose from among several methods to implement treaties
and thereby maintain the balance of the treaty power.' It is a far more
flexible approach than judicial limits, but it suffers from many of the
same problems, with several of its methods resulting in either a loss of
international influence and bargaining power, or the casting aside of fed-
eralism concerns.
A fourth "way" of finding treaty power limits requires us to seek
limitations in the language of treaties themselves. This is the realm of
the federal state clause, the clarification, and the reservation, understand-
ing, or declaration. Each of these methods-and in particular the use of
federal state clauses-has the potential to maintain the ability for deci-
sive federal action while protecting the rights of the states. Each method,
however, has drawbacks during treaty negotiation. The federal state
clause may be expensive to bargain for, since most parties to multilateral
agreements are non-federal states and are likely to resent the lessened
treaty obligations of federal states.160 Clarifications, reservations, under-
standings and declarations all represent deviations from the wording of
the treaty, and by choosing to use these methods, the United States may
indirectly encourage other states to limit their treaty obligations as well.
Treaties obtain value from their ability to regulate the actions of foreign
states in predictable ways, and the inclusion of reservations or other
tools to limit state obligations undermines that predictability.
A new approach to treaties is needed. By "filling in the gaps" in
state implementation of treaties at the federal level, the fill in the gaps
approach can preserve the balance between foreign policy power and
federalism restraint. This approach gives the states meaningful choices
with regard to treaty implementation, while allowing the federal govern-
ment to speak with one voice at the negotiating table. It represents a
compromise formed from the current state of the treaty power, and as
such does not require new legislation, new judicial precedent, or the
inclusion of new treaty clauses-only a new approach to treaties on the
part of the executive. "Filling in the gaps" also removes concerns of
"commandeering" since the states are not forced to implement treaties.
Instead, it puts responsibility for limiting federal power squarely with
the states, the very entities that are best motivated to do so, and it
159. Hollis, supra note 15, at 1361.
160. Looper, supra note 109, at 179.
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encourages the federal government and state governments to work
together in the enforcement of international obligations.
Would increasing use of the fill in the gaps approach settle the
treaty power issue once and for all? Only time can tell. The approach has
never been used in the implementation of an actual treaty, and as a result
there is no empirical way to evaluate the approach's strengths and weak-
nesses. On its face, though, the fill in the gaps approach presents a work-
able framework for the treaty power, capable of solving federalism
problems in treaty implementation while still allowing for unburdened
federal participation in important international agreements.
